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USING BURDENS OF PROOF TO ALLOCATE THE RISK OF
ERROR WHEN ASSESSING DEVELOPMENTAL MATURITY
OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS

DAVID L. FAIGMAN* & KELSEY GEISER**
ABSTRACT
Behavioral and neuroscientific research provides a relatively clear
window into the timing of developmental maturity from adolescence
to early adulthood. We know with considerable confidence that, on
average, sixteen-year-olds are less developmentally mature than
nineteen-year-olds, who are less developmentally mature than
twenty-three-year-olds, who are less developmentally mature than
twenty-six-year-olds. However, in the context of a given case, the
question presented might be whether a particular seventeen-year-old
defendant convicted of murder is “developmentally mature enough”
that a sentence of life without parole can be constitutionally imposed
on him or her. While developmental maturity can be accurately
measured in group data, it cannot be assessed in individuals with
confidence. This fact is an instance of a fundamental disconnect that
occurs at the intersection of science and law between what scientists
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study and what courts ordinarily need to know. Scientists typically
study phenomena at the group or population level, whereas courts
usually need to determine whether a particular case is an instance
of some known phenomenon. This is called the group to individual
(G2i) problem.
Although the G2i problem cannot be fully resolved, it can be
managed by using the base-rate data available in the research
literature to set the burden of proof. Setting the burden of proof is a
classic mechanism for allocating the risks of making a mistake. Two
factors in particular inform judgments about allocating risk of error,
with the first being the likelihood or frequency of the fact in question
and the second being the costs associated with the error. The rarer
the fact and the larger the cost of a mistake, the greater the burden
of proof should be. The latter factor, the costs associated with error,
lies behind the traditional burdens of proof of preponderance of
evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in civil and criminal
cases, respectively. In contrast, while the former factor, the frequency
of the fact in question, is used regularly in areas of applied science,
it has generally not informed allocations of burdens of proof in court.
This Article sets forth a framework of shifting burdens of proof
grounded in the research literature that can be employed to allocate
the risk of error when assessing developmental maturity in the
sentencing of offenders across the age spectrum.
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INTRODUCTION
In Roper v. Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing youthful offenders
who committed capital crimes before the age of eighteen due to the
inherent immaturity of adolescents relative to adults.1 Although
the Court recognized that this categorical rule was both over- and
under-inclusive because some offenders younger than eighteen are
considered developmentally mature and some over that age are not,
the difficulty lay in identifying which were which.2 This is a classic
example of a core challenge that lies at the intersection of law and
science. Whereas scientists primarily research phenomena at the
population or group level, courts typically seek to answer whether
a particular case is an instance of some phenomenon.3 This is
referred to as the “group to individual” (G2i) problem, an issue of
statistical inference that plagues most uses of scientific research in
court.4 Although the problem appears in virtually all situations in
which scientific research is used to inform individual courtroom
decisions, there is no one approach that can be used across legal
contexts to manage it.5 In this Article, we consider an approach to
meeting the G2i problem in the context of sentencing youthful
offenders in which the constitutional rule was set at the group
level—age of offender at time of offense—but its application inevitably must be done at the individual level. We propose using
burdens of proof, a classic mechanism for balancing the cost of

1. 543 U.S. 551, 573-75 (2005).
2. Id. at 574. There is some inconsistency as to how to define the stages of adolescence
and adulthood because brain development does not follow a single chronological trajectory.
See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors’ Access to
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCH. 583,
592-93 (2009). For clarity, we define early adolescence as ten to thirteen, middle adolescence
as fourteen to seventeen, late adolescence as eighteen to twenty-one, and young adulthood as
twenty-two to twenty-five.
3. See David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert
Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 419 (2014).
4. Id. at 417, 420.
5. See id. at 419-20.
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making errors under conditions of uncertainty, to best manage the
G2i problem in the sentencing of youthful offenders.6
We begin in Part I with a brief background on the limitations
posed by the group to individual problem and an introduction to
how it applies to sentencing youthful offenders. Parts II, III, and IV
focus exclusively on the law and science surrounding the issue of
assessing developmental maturity in different age cohorts. Part V
returns to the question of sentencing in light of the fear of “permanent incorrigibility.”
I. THE GROUP TO INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM
The law has largely failed to recognize the fundamental disconnect between the usual level of study in science and what courts
typically expect when they employ scientific evidence to decide
cases. Although courts decide cases based on the individual or
situation at hand, scientists primarily conduct studies at the group
level.7 Unfortunately, group observations rarely apply universally
to their individual members, meaning that group- or populationlevel findings may only provide weak support for individual
determinations.8 For example, scientists may have considerable
confidence that cross-racial identifications are less accurate than
same-race identifications or that the chemical Benzene causes
leukemia, but this research cannot show with confidence that a
particular identification is accurate or that Benzene caused a
particular person’s leukemia.

6. Professor William Berry recently published an excellent article in which he sought to
solve the same issue considered here, the under- and over-inclusivity problem created by
Roper’s bright-line rule at eighteen years of age. See William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment
Presumptive Penumbras (and Juvenile Offenders), 106 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2020). Similarly relying on the developmental literature, he compellingly argues that courts should extend the
insight that youthful offenders are largely still immature beyond the age of eighteen. See id.
at 6 n.23. However, Professor Berry solves this problem using the notion of “penumbras,” thus
creating a gray area around the age of maturity. See id. at 6. While interesting, we believe
that employing burdens of proof will accomplish the objective that we share with Professor
Berry, but in a way that provides greater guidance to the sentencer.
7. See Russell A. Poldrack et al., Predicting Violent Behavior: What Can Neuroscience
Add?, 22 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 111, 115 (2018).
8. See id.
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In the eyewitness accuracy example, researchers study accuracy
rates between groups of eyewitnesses. A particularly robust finding
in this literature comes from comparisons of same-race identifications to cross-race identifications. Typically in this research, one
group of subjects is given a scenario that requires same-race
identifications and another group different-race identifications.9
This research finds that, on average, same-race identifications are
more accurate than different-race identifications.10 However,
nothing in the research literature indicates that an eyewitness
researcher could reliably determine whether a particular cross-race
identification was accurate.11 As a consequence of this inherent
limitation of the research, eyewitness experts ordinarily are permitted to testify only to the general phenomenon and do not offer a
clinical opinion regarding an individual case.12
Eyewitness identification experts generally conform their
testimony to how most scientists would approach application of
their findings. Scientists ordinarily describe their research probabilistically and apply it to some group or population.13 Any
application of the findings to an individual is usually done probabilistically as well.14 In forecasting whether it will rain this
afternoon, for instance, meteorologists estimate the likelihood it
will rain based on models built from group data and speak to
individual cases using likelihood estimates.15 Similarly, when
doctors provide informed consent regarding whether a drug causes
9. See Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the OwnRace Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 13
(2001).
10. See, e.g., John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial
Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 211 (2001); John C. Brigham et al., Accuracy of
Eyewitness Identifications in a Field Setting, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 673, 674
(1982).
11. See, e.g., Rutledge, supra note 10, at 211.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 72 (D. Mass. 1999) (“The function
of the expert here is not to say to the jury—‘you should believe or not believe the
eyewitness’.... All that the expert does is provide the jury with more information with which
the jury can then make a more informed decision.”).
13. See Faigman et al., supra note 3, at 419.
14. See id. at 421-22.
15. See Nat’l Ctrs. for Env’t Info., Numerical Weather Prediction, https://www.ncei.noaa.
gov/products/weather-climate-models/numerical-weather-prediction#:~:text=The%20
GFS%20model%20is%20a [https://perma.cc/AK8L-QMTX].
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side effects, the information is provided statistically, not as a statement of scientific certainty. In other words, scientists ordinarily
retain their group perspective even when describing individual
cases.
In the example of Benzene, however, courts expect a different
approach to the scientific evidence, despite the similar limitations
of the underlying science. In the area of medical causation, typically
arising in cases involving toxic torts or medical malpractice, courts
insist on expert testimony regarding the individual case.16 The issue
of “general causation,” that is, can Benzene cause leukemia, remains a threshold issue that must be supported by valid research.17
However, courts also require proof of “specific causation” in such
cases—in other words, sufficient proof that Benzene caused the
plaintiff’s leukemia.18
Over the years, courts and the experts that appear before them in
cases involving disputes over medical causation have jerry-rigged a
method to overcome the disconnect between what science can
confidently do and what the law demands of it. This method is
referred to as “differential etiology,” and essentially calls on clinical
judgment to “rule-in” the plaintiff’s claimed cause of the injury and
“rule-out” all alternative causes.19 This process of logical deduction
is largely ill-defined,20 yet inevitably leads to statements from
experts that the plaintiff’s condition was caused by a particular
16. See, e.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 2d 101, 115 (D.
Mass. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Milward v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 820 F.3d 469 (1st Cir. 2016).
17. See id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., REPORT ON CARCINOGENS:
BENZENE (14th ed. 2016), https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/content/profiles/benzene.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AT6D-G7PE].
18. See, e.g., Milward, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (holding that without proof of specific
causation, summary judgment in favor of defendant was appropriate); see also In re Aredia
& Zometa Prods. Liab. Litig., 483 F. App’x 182, 191 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Because Plaintiff failed
to demonstrate an essential element of her case, specific causation, the grant of summary
judgment was appropriate.”).
19. FED. JUD. CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 617-18 (3d ed. 2011) (“In
a differential etiology, an expert first determines other known causes of the disease in question and then attempts to ascertain whether those competing causes can be ‘ruled out’ as a
cause of plaintiff’s disease .... By ruling out (or ruling in) the possibility of other causes, the
probability that a given agent was the cause of an individual’s disease can be refined.”); see
Joseph Sanders et al., Differential Etiology: Inferring Specific Causation in the Law from
Group Data in Science, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 851, 853-54 (2021).
20. In a recent article, one of us (Faigman), along with several coauthors—all trained as
scientists, sought to remedy this deficiency. See generally Sanders et al., supra note 19, at 6.
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substance “to a reasonable degree of [scientific] certainty.”21 Such
conclusions appear to be little more than oft-repeated mantras that
have little basis in either science or law.22
Hence, although science almost invariably operates at the group
level, its use in court depends on the legal framework in which it is
being fitted. Returning to the above examples, research on eyewitness identification is relevant and admissible at the group level
because it educates the fact-finder regarding factors that might
interfere with accuracy.23 Research on Benzene is also relevant and
admissible at the group level, but courts have deemed it necessary
that experts opine on the individual case as well, even if such opinions have little empirical support.24
The lesson here is that, despite the limitations inherent in the
G2i problem, the law determines the necessary level at which expert
testimony must be presented—group or group and individual.25
Although different legal or scientific contexts might demand different kinds of presentation, the goal for the law should be to
resolve the G2i problem in ways that are conducive to obtaining the
most valid scientific opinions possible while also serving the
practical demands involved in trying individual cases. Arguably,
this is what has occurred in both the eyewitness and Benzene
examples, albeit in different ways. In the former, individualized
expert opinions are not necessary for the fact-finders to do their
jobs.26 The insight that eyewitnesses are not as accurate under
certain specific conditions as perhaps generally supposed is helpful
21. Jules M. Epstein, Reasonable Certainty: A Term It Is Certainly Reasonable to Repudiate, 33 CRIM. JUST. 39, 39 (2018) (“Virtually every expert witness examination concludes
with the question ‘and do you hold those beliefs/opinions/conclusions to a reasonable degree
of [discipline] certainty.’ The phrase, like the term ‘insane,’ is a legal construct; but in science
and elsewhere the words have no meaning, as science may include a measure of uncertainty,
scientific knowledge evolves, and there is no agreed metric within or across disciplines for
what degree of certainty—32 percent, 45 percent, 97 percent—is ‘reasonable.’ The standard
is subjective to the declarant.” (alteration in original)).
22. See id.
23. See Thomas D. Albright, Why Eyewitnesses Fail, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 7758,
7759 (2017).
24. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1999) (stressing the
importance of proffered experts identifying “the particular circumstances of the particular
case at issue”).
25. See Faigman et al., supra note 3, at 419.
26. See id. at 432-33.
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to the fact-finder.27 In the latter, fact-finders would be lost without
expert assistance in applying the general science to an individual
case, even if its reliability is uncertain.28 Most fact-finders would
have considerable difficulty reasoning from general toxicological
and epidemiological evidence to determine causation in a specific
case. Experts are presumed to be needed, and they are thought to
be capable of making this inferential deduction.29
The situation of sentencing youthful offenders is something of a
blend of these two examples. First, as with all applied science, the
G2i problem is inherent in the issue of developmental maturity.30
Second, similar to eyewitness identification, group data about the
relative maturity of different age cohorts is relevant for judges and
fact-finders in considering appropriate penalties.31 Third, similar to
the Benzene example, sentencing of a youthful offender is inherently an individualized determination, one in which fact-finders
might benefit from guidance regarding how to apply the general
research literature to individual cases.32 Finally, as the next Part
details, unlike many interactions between law and science, the
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the presence of the G2i
issue in sentencing youthful offenders, though the Court has yet to
identify an appropriate method to manage it.
II. SENTENCING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS UNDER THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has limited courts’ ability
to impose extreme sentences on juvenile and youthful offenders.
The Court has repeatedly recognized that children are different
from adults, so subjecting them to the same extreme punishments
is inconsistent with Eighth Amendment principles.33 In Roper v.
Simmons, the Court held that executing minors under the death
penalty is “cruel and unusual” punishment prohibited by the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See id. at 433.
See id. at 425.
See id. at 435.
See id. at 421.
See id. at 433.
See id. at 425.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005).
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Constitution.34 In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that the same
Eighth Amendment clause prohibited a juvenile offender from being sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for a non-homicide
offense.35 Together, Roper and Graham set forth the “children are
different” or “youth matters” jurisprudence that is used today.36
These cases relied on differences between juveniles and adults that
inform the key Eighth Amendment principles of culpability and
deterrence, such as lack of maturity, increased risk-taking behaviors, susceptibility to outside influences, and inability to appreciate
long-term consequences.37 These cases imposed categorical bans on
extreme sentences for juveniles largely on the basis that a defendant’s immaturity at the time of committing a crime meant that he
or she was less culpable and not amenable to being deterred by
extreme punishment.38 Subsequent to Graham, the Court turned to
the necessary task of how youthful offenders should be sentenced
given the categorical restrictions of Roper and Graham.
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that mandatory LWOP for
a juvenile who committed a homicide was unconstitutional, but held
that this extreme sentence could be imposed on a case-by-case
basis.39 And in Jones v. Mississippi, the Court wrestled with what
showing was necessary to sentence a juvenile who committed a
homicide to LWOP.40
In these cases, however, the Court has tended to confound the
issue of maturity at the time of the offense with the separate issue
of the likelihood the defendant will mature out of his or her youthful
incorrigibility. Both factors—current immaturity and future likelihood of maturing out of incorrigibility—are empirical questions
subject to scientific research. The issue of assessing developmental
stages in youth has been the subject of extensive work.41 As a result,
we have considerable knowledge about the developmental capacities

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 575.
560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
543 U.S. at 569-70; 560 U.S. at 68.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 570; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 74.
567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012).
141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
See, e.g., Steinberg et al., supra note 2.
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of different age cohorts.42 Hence, we know a lot of general information, or “G.” The difficulty lies in assessing a particular youth’s
development, or “i.” In regard to predicting future behavior, however, the research literature is much more problematic. That
research indicates that predictions regarding future dangerousness
cannot be done well at the group level, much less at the individual
level.43
In Roper, Justice Kennedy held that executing minors was unconstitutional and cited the behavioral science literature to support
the finding that juveniles are less developmentally mature than
adults.44 These differences in maturity levels translated to lesser
culpability for juveniles, with corresponding implications for
sentencing them to death.45 The Court explained that “[o]nce the
diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that
the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them
with lesser force than to adults.”46
The Court reasoned that the death penalty primarily serves two
social functions: retribution and deterrence.47 However, these functions manifest differently in regard to youthful offenders as compared to adults.48 The Court stated, “[r]etribution is not proportional
if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability
or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by
reason of youth and immaturity.”49 And the same logic applies to
deterrence: “The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the

42. See id. at 592-93.
43. See John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Generation
of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 10 (1984); see also TEX. DEF. SERV., DEADLY
SPECULATION: MISLEADING TEXAS CAPITAL JURIES WITH FALSE PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE
DANGEROUSNESS 23 (2004), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/tx_defender_
service_subj_deadly_speculation_misleading_tx_capital_juries_with_false_predictions_of_f
uture_dangerousness.pdf [https://perma.cc/36KG-DKRB] (analyzing the disciplinary records
of 155 capital defendants in Texas and finding that expert predictions of future dangerousness
were wrong 95 percent of the time).
44. 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
45. See id. at 569-71.
46. Id. at 571.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id.
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kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the
possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”50
A universal measure for “cognitive capacities or psychosocial
maturity” remains elusive.51 Even if the concept of developmental
maturity could be clearly defined, it is not a notion in which a
threshold is crossed at some specific moment in time.52 Moreover,
while maturity is correlated with age, members of different cohorts
reach cognitive and physical maturity at varying times.53 Given the
variability of the construct of developmental maturity, both in terms
of definition and onset, one might argue that fact-finders should
conduct individualized assessments. As Justice Scalia argued in dissent in Roper, this would require “the sentencer to make an individualized determination, which includes weighing aggravating
factors and mitigating factors, such as youth.”54
The Roper Court rejected this ad hoc approach and rested its
decision on the group data regarding the general immaturity of
offenders under the age of eighteen.55 Although the scientific literature makes clear that most juveniles are less mature than most
adults, there is no method that allows sentencers to validly determine whether a particular defendant is as mature as an adult.56
The Court did not reach the inevitable issue of what penalty
young Mr. Simmons should receive on remand if, indeed, “[i]t is
difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”57 Although the Court did not describe it in
such terms, this is as good a description of the G2i problem as is to
50. Id. at 572 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837
(1988)).
51. Grace Icenogle et al., Adolescents’ Cognitive Capacity Reaches Adult Levels Prior to
Their Psychological Maturity: Evidence for a “Maturity Gap” in a Multinational, CrossSectional Sample, 43 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 69, 71 (2019).
52. See Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform
Public Policy?, 28 ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 2012, at 67, 67-70.
53. See id. at 70.
54. Roper, 543 U.S. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 115-17 (1982)).
55. See id. at 569-70 (majority opinion).
56. See Steinberg et al., supra note 2, at 591-93.
57. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
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be found in a Supreme Court decision. The Court acknowledged that
some juveniles may exhibit behavior that is “irretrievably depraved”
or that shows “irreparable corruption” as to justify a death sentence,
but failed to define these terms.58 Despite this possibility, the Court
still held that a total ban was appropriate.59 In the next case on the
issue of developmental maturity, the Court again focused on the “G”
of G2i, though it was becoming evident that the issue of “i” was
looming.
In Graham v. Florida, the Court applied the logic of lessened
juvenile culpability from Roper to LWOP for juvenile offenders.60
The Court again rejected the case-by-case approach in holding that
the Eighth Amendment does not permit a juvenile offender to be
sentenced to LWOP for a non-homicide offense.61 The Court’s
reasoning closely tracked that of Roper:
The case-by-case approach to sentencing must, however, be
confined by some boundaries. The dilemma of juvenile sentencing demonstrates this. For even if we were to assume that some
juvenile nonhomicide offenders might have “sufficient psychological maturity, and at the same time demonstrat[e] sufficient
depravity,” to merit a life without parole sentence, it does not
follow that courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach
could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible
juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for
change.62

According to the Graham Court, there is no legitimate penological
justification for condemning a juvenile to die in prison, and the
Court reasoned that such a sentence would deny a juvenile the
ability to eventually realize the extent of “human worth and
potential.”63
Like Roper, the Graham approach has much to recommend it,
especially as a matter of establishing a categorical constitutional
standard marking the line between immaturity and maturity in
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 570, 573.
Id. at 568.
See 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
Id. at 68, 74.
Id. at 77 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572).
Id. at 77, 79.
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regard to the principles embedded in the Eighth Amendment.64
However, also like Roper, Graham avoids the inevitable issue of how
the lower court should sentence Mr. Graham if “incorrigible juvenile
offenders” cannot be distinguished from “the many that have the capacity for change.”65
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court finally reached the issue that it
had largely avoided in Roper and Graham.66 The Miller Court held
that mandatory LWOP for those under eighteen at the time of
committing a homicide violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishments.67 This holding, of course, contemplates that some juveniles who have committed homicide might
be sentenced to LWOP. The Court stated that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will
be uncommon.”68 “That is especially so,” the Court said, because of
the difficulty of distinguishing “the juvenile offender whose crime
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”69 In other
words, the Miller Court suggested that LWOP should be barred for
juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of
youth in contrast to those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.70
The Court stated that lower courts must “take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”71 The Court
64. See id. at 82.
65. Id. at 77.
66. See 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 479.
69. Id. at 479-80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005); Graham, 560 U.S.
at 68). The Court gave no exact definition of what would make a juvenile irreparably corrupt,
and the phrase does not come from the scientific literature. See id.
70. See id. at 479-80. But see Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1317-18 (2021)
(interpreting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), and Miller, 567 U.S. 460, as not
requiring “a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility”). The amici in Miller
emphasized the difficulty in determining permanent incorrigibility, stating “there is no
reliable way to determine that a juvenile’s offenses are the result of an irredeemably corrupt
character.” Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 25, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 174239, at *25
(emphasis added).
71. Miller, 567 U.S. at 480. The Court identified five factors to be considered in determining whether to impose a LWOP sentence on a juvenile: (1) his “immaturity, impetuosity,
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highlighted juveniles’ heightened capacity for change and held that
judges and juries should take this into account when determining
whether a juvenile LWOP sentence is appropriate.72 Essentially, the
Court intended sentencers to make a prediction about how a particular juvenile will behave decades in the future—a decision that
research has shown is impossible to make with confidence.73
Predictions of an adult’s future dangerousness, let alone a
juvenile’s, are unreliable, inaccurate, and pose a particular concern
with regard to racial bias.74 Racial bias plays a significant role in
predictions of future dangerousness as adults and children of color
are more likely to be viewed as more violent and more likely to
reoffend.75
This case-by-case assessment of youthful defendants was exactly
the sort of determination the Court found problematic in Roper and
Graham.76 In fact, the Miller Court understood that the decision
stepped back from a core insight of these earlier cases.77 It observed:
“Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of
and failure to appreciate risks and consequences;” (2) his “family and home environment;” (3)
“the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the
conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him;” (4) “that he might
have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with
youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors ... or his incapacity
to assist his own attorneys;” and (5) “the possibility of rehabilitation.” Id. at 477-78.
72. See id. at 479-80.
73. Ample research demonstrates that predicting juvenile and adult behavior, especially
that far into the future, is incredibly difficult and tends to be overinclusive, also known as
the “false positive problem.” See Kimberly Larson et al., Miller v. Alabama: Implications for
Forensic Mental Health Assessment at the Intersection of Social Science and the Law, 39 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 319, 335-36 (2013) (“[T]here is currently no basis in
current behavioral science nor well-informed professional knowledge that can support any
reliable forensic expert opinion on the relative likelihood of a specific adolescent’s prospects
for rehabilitation at a date that may be years to decades in the future.”); Alex R. Piquero,
Youth Matters: The Meaning of Miller for Theory, Research, and Policy Regarding Developmental/Life-Course Criminology, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 355
(2013) (“[I]t is very difficult to predict early in the life-course which individual juvenile
offender will go on to become a recidivistic adult offender.”).
74. See Piquero, supra note 73, at 355; JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED
BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS TO AGE 70 289-90 (2003) (explaining the
limitations of using juvenile risk factors to attempt to predict future criminal behavior);
Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and Recidivism: Predictive Bias
and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 681 (2016).
75. See Skeem & Lowenkamp, supra note 74, at 681.
76. See 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005); 560 U.S. 48, 75, 77-78 (2010).
77. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 483.
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offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or
Graham. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain
process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.”78
Brief reflection, however, reveals that Miller is not analytically
different from Roper and Graham. In all three contexts, lower courts
are in the position of having “a sentencer follow a certain process—
considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—
before imposing a particular penalty.”79 Under Roper, defendants
are not subject to the death penalty, but they still need to be sentenced and could possibly be sentenced to LWOP.80 Under Graham,
non-homicide defendants may not have been sentenced to LWOP,
but they were still sentenced to some period of time.81 Finally, under
Miller, juvenile homicide offenders are not subject to mandatory
LWOP, but they still may receive LWOP or a lesser sentence.82
Inevitably, whatever value there might be in setting clear lines by
age-cohort, individual sentencing cannot be avoided.
Most recently, the Court appeared to reverse course in its treatment of extreme sentences for juvenile and youthful offenders in
Jones v. Mississippi.83 The Jones Court held that a sentencer is not
required to make a separate factual finding of “permanent incorrigibility” before sentencing a juvenile to LWOP.84 The Court held
that in such cases, a discretionary sentencing system is “both
constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.”85 The
Court continued, stating “so long as the sentencer has discretion to
‘consider the mitigating qualities of youth’ and impose a lesser
punishment,” any juvenile convicted of homicide may be sentenced
to LWOP, even if his or her crime reflects transient immaturity.86
While the Court maintained that it did not overrule Miller, it is
a troubling step away from a line of cases making clear that

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
543 U.S. at 572.
560 U.S. at 74.
567 U.S. at 465.
See 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1314 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 476).
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rehabilitation is the focus when juveniles are charged with crimes.87
Further, the dissent highlighted how prior Supreme Court rulings,
including Miller, emphasized that “children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”88 Even if we were
to accept the idea that some children are “irreparably corrupt”—
which is not supported by available medical and psychological
evidence89—that would indicate a need for rehabilitation rather
than punishment given our scientific understanding of behavioral
and neurocognitive maturation. But this is not where the Jones
Court landed. In light of the Court’s apparent course reversal, it is
now more important than ever to establish an empirically grounded
legal process for handling the G2i problem in juvenile sentencing.
The next Part begins to map such a process.
III. BURDENS OF PROOF AND DEVELOPMENTAL MATURITY
While the G2i issue poses barriers to making determinations in
a particular case with confidence, that does not mean that the
process of making inferences from G to i cannot be guided by rational principles. Science can set the initial presumptions or a priori
starting point for evaluating specific cases. Hence, in the eyewitness
identification example discussed in Part I, the fact that the witness
and perpetrator were of different races, all things being equal,
indicates that an identification may be unreliable.90 However, rarely
are all things equal. Other factors, such as how much time the
witness had to observe the individual, the lighting conditions under
which the identification was made, the distance between the witness
and the individual, among other factors, might indicate otherwise.91
The general science can provide a framework within which other
considerations ought to be taken into account. At the same time, the
87. See id. at 1321.
88. Id. at 1328 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471).
89. Evidence suggests that most juvenile offenders do not continue such behavior into
adulthood, but rather desist as they mature. See Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and
Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCH.REV. 674,
675 (1993); Edward P. Mulvey et al., Trajectories of Desistance and Continuity in Antisocial
Behavior Following Court Adjudication Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 22 DEV. &
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 453, 454, 468 (2010).
90. See Albright, supra note 23, at 7762.
91. See id.
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stronger the general science, more additional considerations should
be needed to say that this case is not an instance of the general
phenomenon.92 If, for example, 90 percent of cases in which crossrace identification are made result in inaccurate identifications, this
would create a strong presumption that the specific identification
in question is inaccurate.
An additional and important consideration in deciding whether
a particular case is an instance of some general phenomenon is the
cost of making a mistake. In general, there are two kinds of errors.
False positive errors occur when we mistakenly conclude that a case
is an instance of some phenomenon.93 Hence, concluding that an
identification was accurate when it was not is a false positive
error.94 Alternatively, false negative errors occur when we mistakenly conclude that a case is not an instance of some phenomenon.95
Hence, concluding that an identification was inaccurate when it was
accurate is a false negative error.96
Different errors have different consequences. This insight is wellcaptured by Blackstone’s famous statement that it is “better that
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”97 According to this judgment, false positive convictions are ten times worse
than false negative acquittals.98
Blackstone’s insight is operationalized in the law by the burden
of proof employed in criminal trials, which requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.99 The burden of proof in civil cases, in contrast, is
a mere preponderance of the evidence,100 suggesting that we are
largely ambivalent between false positive and false negative errors
in civil cases. In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court made this

92. See id. at 7762-63.
93. False Positive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
94. See id.
95. False Negative, STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2014).
96. See id.
97. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. See generally Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (2015).
98. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *358.
99. See Reasonable Doubt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
100. See Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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calculation explicit in adopting a clear and convincing evidence
standard for civil commitment cases.101 Civil commitment is “quasicriminal,” in that the defendant stands to lose his or her liberty if
committed.102 At the same time, the Addington Court recognized the
cost of erring in the other direction would mean that a mentally ill
person would not receive treatment.103 The Court explained: “In
considering what standard should govern in a civil commitment
proceeding, we must assess both the extent of the individual’s
interest in not being involuntarily confined indefinitely and the
state’s interest in committing the emotionally disturbed under a
particular standard of proof.”104 In regard to the consequences of
making an error, the Court asserted: “It cannot be said ... that it is
much better for a mentally ill person to ‘go free’ than for a mentally
normal person to be committed.”105 This calculation resulted in the
adoption of the intermediate burden of clear and convincing evidence, a standard that lies between proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and preponderance of the evidence.106
Burdens of proof, therefore, effectively embody two key considerations, one quantitative and the other normative. The greater the
frequency of some general phenomenon, of which a particular case
is thought to be an instance, the greater should be the burden to
demonstrate that it is not. And the greater the harm that might
come from a particular type of error, the greater the burden should
be to avoid making that error.
As the Court in Roper recognized, selecting eighteen years as the
dividing line for developmental maturity was essentially arbitrary.107 The behavioral and neuroscience literatures bear this out.
Maturity, which itself is not a unidimensional construct, occurs over
time, with age cohorts varying considerably.108 The research liter101. 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
102. See id. at 424. It is worth emphasizing that the “criminal” component of the “quasicriminal” nature of civil commitment is not based on any culpability of the defendant, but
rather the prospect of the defendant’s loss of liberty, which is analogous to the consequence
confronted by a criminal defendant.
103. See id. at 432.
104. Id. at 425.
105. Id. at 429.
106. See id. at 430-33.
107. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
108. See Steinberg et al., supra note 2, at 588-91.
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ature generally supports the view that brain development continues
throughout the lifespan, with dynamic changes taking place during
early, middle, and late adolescence through approximately age
twenty-five.109 As different facets of psychological and neural
functioning develop along different timelines, there is no scientific
evidence of a specific age that humans move from childhood to
adulthood.110
Adolescent brains are neither advanced child brains nor immature adult brains—they are specifically tailored to meet the needs
of the young-adulthood stage of life.111 There is a large and growing
body of literature dedicated to better understanding how and which
ways children, adolescents, and young adults differ.
Current empirical evidence from the behavioral sciences
suggests that adolescents differ from adults and children in
three important ways that lead to differences in behavior.
[(1)] adolescents lack mature capacity for self-regulation in
emotionally charged contexts, relative to adults and children[;]

109. See COMM. ON IMPROVING THE HEALTH, SAFETY, & WELL-BEING OF YOUNG ADULTS,
INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, INVESTING IN THE HEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF YOUNG
ADULTS 35-42 (2015).
110. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science,
Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 648 (2016). Recently, “research
on adolescent behavior has been increasingly influenced by ... perspectives on the adolescent
brain that emphasize the different developmental trajectories of brain systems that govern
incentive processing and cognitive control.” Laurence Steinberg et al., Around the World,
Adolescence Is a Time of Heightened Sensation Seeking and Immature Self-Regulation, 21
DEVELOPMENTAL SCI., No. 2, 2018, at 2. Accordingly, “risky behavior in adolescence is the
product of the interaction between changes in two distinct neurobiological systems: a ‘socioemotional’ system ... and a ‘cognitive control’ system.” Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems
Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 216 (2010). The
maturation of these systems is:
gradual, unfolds over the course of adolescence, and permits more advanced self
regulation and impulse control. The temporal gap between the arousal of the
socioemotional system, which is an early adolescent development, and the full
maturation of the cognitive control system, which occurs later, creates a period
of heightened vulnerability to risk-taking during middle adolescence.
Id. Some researchers have described this imbalance as akin to starting a car’s engine before
a well-functioning brake system is in place. See, e.g., Monica Payne, “All Gas and No Brakes!”:
Helpful Metaphor or Harmful Stereotype?, 27 J. ADOLESCENT RSCH. 3 (2012).
111. See COMM. ON ASSESSING JUV. JUST. REFORM & COMM. ON L. & JUST., NAT’L RSCH.
COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 89-91 (2013).
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[(2)] adolescents have a heightened sensitivity to proximal
external influences, such as peer pressure and immediate
incentives, relative to adults[; and]
[(3)] adolescents show less ability to make judgments and
decisions that require future orientation.112

Undoubtedly, some percentage at each age might be said to be
“mature” for legal—that is, Eighth Amendment—purposes, possibly
beginning younger than eighteen. That percentage increases with
age, so that, on average, the percentage of nineteen-year-olds that
are “mature” is greater than the percentage of eighteen-year-olds,
and a greater percentage of twenty-year-olds are mature compared
to nineteen-year-olds, and so on through age twenty-five.113 This
insight, drawn from a rich developmental literature, suggests that
burdens of proof might very well establish threshold standards for
factual judgments about maturity. Simply put, the younger the defendant, the greater should be the prosecution’s burden to show
maturity.
Additionally, as discussed above, there is a normative component
to burdens of proof. The greater the costs of making a mistake, the
greater should be the burden established against it.114 In the context
of sentencing, and especially in the context of youthful offenders,
the prospect of making a false positive error of too long a sentence
is considerable.115 Of course, the defendants in these cases have
been convicted of serious crimes, so false negative errors are problematic as well.116 On balance, although we believe that the costs
associated with false positive errors in sentencing substantially
outweigh those associated with false negatives, reasonable people
can disagree. However, on the empirical question of developing
112. Id. at 91 (citing Leah H. Somerville et al., Behavioral and Neural Representation of
Emotional Facial Expressions Across the Lifespan, 36 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY
408, 420-23 (2011)); Bernd Figner et al., Affective and Deliberative Processes in Risky Choice:
Age Differences in Risk Taking in the Columbia Card Task, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 709,
710-11 (2009); Steinberg, supra note 52, at 67-70).
113. See Steinberg et al., supra note 2, at 588-91.
114. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *358.
115. See COMM. ON ASSESSING JUV. JUST. REFORM & COMM. ON L. & JUST., supra note 111,
at 129-30, 186-87.
116. See Epps, supra note 97, at 1068-70.
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maturity over age-cohorts, there is considerably less room for
disagreement. In the following Part, therefore, we propose a regime
of shifting burdens of proof for sentencing youthful offenders
primarily on the quantitative base-rates for maturity in each
cohort.117
IV. EMPLOYING BURDENS OF PROOF FOR SENTENCING
YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS
Although the associated subjects of presumptions, burdens of
production, and burdens of proof can be complex, for present purposes we focus only on the two related concepts of presumptions and
burdens of proof—with the latter sometimes referred to as burdens
of persuasion.118 There are two basic types of presumptions:
conclusive and rebuttable.119 A conclusive presumption is essentially
a rule of law.120 The Roper Court created a conclusive presumption
in holding that a defendant who committed a capital crime before
turning eighteen is too immature to be sentenced to death.121 In the
framework of presumptions, finding the defendant to be under eighteen when the crime occurred means that the Eighth Amendment
forbids imposing a sentence of death on him.122
A rebuttable presumption is true to its name and can be rebutted
with adequate proof.123 For example, the presumption that a person
missing for seven years is dead can be rebutted with evidence that
he is, in fact, alive. The question of what level of proof is adequate
to rebut a presumption can be answered differently and is best
117. To the extent that courts or policymakers disagree regarding the balance of normative
factors between false positives and false negatives, they might adjust the proposed burdens
of proof accordingly. Such disagreement does not undermine the wisdom, based on solid empirical grounds, to employ burdens of proof in these cases.
118. See GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 572 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th
ed. 2006) (observing that presumptions are the “slipperiest member of the family of legal
terms,” except perhaps for “burden of proof”).
119. See id. at 572-73.
120. See id.
121. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). The Court created a similar conclusive presumption in Graham, holding that someone who committed a non-homicide offense
prior to turning eighteen was too immature to be sentenced to LWOP. See Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
122. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
123. See DIX ET AL., supra note 118, at 572-73.
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understood as involving burdens of proof, or burdens of persuasion.124 Hence, a criminal defendant is presumed innocent, but that
presumption can be overcome with proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.125
The Supreme Court established the conclusive presumption of
immaturity at age eighteen in death penalty and non-homicide
LWOP cases.126 Yet nothing magical occurs at the moment when
someone turns eighteen in regard to brain development. The general
phenomenon of developmental maturity is complex and ultimately
probabilistic.127 People and their brains develop over time and not
uniformly.128 So few youthful offenders under eighteen are “mature”
for Eighth Amendment purposes that the entire cohort is conclusively deemed immature. As offender ages increase, the percentages of offenders that are considered “mature” changes—for example, the vast number of twenty-five-year-olds are “mature” for
Eighth Amendment purposes.129
This empirical reality suggests a straightforward and rational
solution to sentencing youthful offenders. The burden of proof
should relate to the base rate of maturity in respective age cohorts
between eighteen and twenty-five. Under eighteen, as held in Roper
and Graham, defendants are conclusively presumed to be immature
for Eighth Amendment purposes in death penalty and non-homicide
LWOP cases.130 We would suggest the following burdens of proof
thereafter.
124. See DOUGLAS WALTON, BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTION AND ARGUMENTATION 8
(2014) (“[W]hen burden of proof and presumption are linked together, they function as evidential devices that are useful and even necessary when dealing with defeasible arguments
that need to be used under conditions of uncertainty and lack of knowledge.”).
125. Douglas Walton, in his excellent treatment of the subject, explains the insight of burdens of proof as follows:
Generally speaking, the burden of proof tells you how strong an argument needs
to be in order to be successful. It represents a description of a task such that if
you fail to carry out this task, your argument will fail. Burden of proof rests on
the prior notion that there can be different standards of proof appropriate for
different contexts of argumentation.
Id. at 8-9.
126. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574; Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.
127. See Steinberg et al., supra note 2, at 590-93.
128. See id.
129. See id.; Graham, 560 U.S. at 79; Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
130. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574; Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.

1312

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1289

For defendants who have committed crimes under the age of
eighteen, the prosecution should have the burden to prove maturity
beyond a reasonable doubt.131 For defendants accused of committing crimes between eighteen and twenty, the prosecution should
have the burden to prove maturity by clear and convincing evidence;
for defendants accused of committing crimes between twenty-one
and twenty-three, the prosecution should have the burden to show
maturity by a preponderance of evidence; and for those defendants
accused of committing crimes between twenty-four and twenty-six,
the defendant should have the burden to demonstrate immaturity
by clear and convincing evidence. After the defendant turns twentysix, he or she should be presumed mature, though he or she could
provide proof to the contrary. For a visual representation of our
proposal, see Table 1 below.
Table 1. Proposal for Shifting Burdens of Proof/Presumptions for
Competency of Youthful Offenders
Age at
Who bears
commission
the burden?
of offense
Under 18*
State/
18-20
Government
21-23

Evidentiary standard

To prove?

Beyond a reasonable doubt

That defendant is
Clear & convincing evidence developmentally
mature
Preponderance of the evidence

That defendant is
not
Defendant
developmentally
Over 26
Beyond a reasonable doubt
mature
*Except in death penalty or non-homicide LWOP cases, where Roper and Graham
impose a conclusive presumption—that is, a rule of law—that the defendant is not
developmentally mature.
24-26

Clear & convincing evidence

131. As noted in Part II, although Roper and Graham hold categorically that minors cannot
be sentenced to death in homicide cases or LWOP in non-homicide cases, the defendant’s
maturity remains an issue for determining what sentence is appropriate under those ceilings.
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At sentencing, therefore, we propose that the sentencer be
instructed that when a defendant was under twenty-six when he or
she committed the crime, developmental maturity must be determined separately according to the burdens of proof outlined above.
Of course, many factors go into sentencing decisions beyond
maturity level at the time the crime was committed.132 A host of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances are considered in determining the appropriate sentence for the crime committed.133
However, as pointed out in the several Supreme Court decisions
considered above, youthfulness and the notion of incorrigibility
ought to be essential considerations in the decision.134
Finally, it should be noted that although the empirical literature
can help establish the levels of proof needed to determine maturity
of a particular defendant, the assessment under that umbrella is
likely to be largely the product of some narrative about the life and
times of the defendant and his or her amenability to rehabilitation,
either through natural maturation or education. The research, as
Justice Kennedy noted in Roper, simply cannot distinguish whether
an individual defendant’s crime was a product of “transient immaturity” or “irreparable corruption.”135 Proof on this issue is likely to be
nonempirical and narrative in content.136
For instance, in a particular case, the prosecution might point out
the prior intricate planning and the subsequent cover-up of the
crime to prove maturity; the defense might point out the extreme
132. See generally Thomas Grisso & Antoinette Kavanaugh, Prospects for Developmental
Evidence in Juvenile Sentencing Based on Miller v. Alabama, 22 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 235
(2016).
133. See id.; Steinberg et al., supra note 2, at 585.
134. See supra Part II; see also Steinberg et al., supra note 2, at 585.
135. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
136. Although the sentencing decision is likely to be primarily based on normative and
nonempirical considerations, the general research literature in developmental psychology
might yet provide clinical insights regarding individual offenders. See Grisso & Kavanaugh,
supra note 132, at 246 (“Developmental science has successfully provided the research
evidence that the law needed to make its normative decisions about juveniles’ lesser maturity
and culpability. We now face the task of creating models and methods to provide relevant developmental and clinical data about individuals in cases involving Miller sentencing and
resentencing.”). Nonetheless, the G2i problem will remain a substantial stumbling block to
the reliable application of group data to individual defendants. See Carl E. Fisher et al.,
Toward a Jurisprudence of Psychiatric Evidence: Examining the Challenges of Reasoning from
Group Data in Psychiatry to Individual Decisions in the Law, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 685, 688
(2015).
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gullibility and marginal IQ of the defendant to prove immaturity.
The ultimate decision is for sentencers, but, as recommended here,
they should be guided by burdens of proof that are informed by the
base rates for the defendant’s age cohort.
V. THE SENTENCING DECISION
As discussed above, the Supreme Court confused two factors in its
cases that consider developmental maturity and Eighth Amendment
standards.137 The principal basis for treating children differently
from adults was the empirical finding regarding their levels of immaturity.138 Such developmental immaturity is inconsistent with the
twin justifications for punishment under the Eighth Amendment:
culpability and deterrence.139 A developmentally immature child is
less culpable for his offense and less likely to be deterred by
punishment.140 Hence, in Roper and Graham, in which the focus was
on the demands of the Eighth Amendment, the principal consideration involved the contemporaneous level of maturity of the youthful
offender.141 However, always looming in the background was the
separate question of sentencing. If the Eighth Amendment does not
permit the death penalty for juvenile murderers or LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenders, then what sentences should they
receive?
Whereas in considering the outer limits of what sentence might
be imposed involves an Eighth Amendment analysis, sentencing
within those limits might consider a vast number of factors, both
mitigating and aggravating.142 Most of these factors come in narrative form, since they are either not amenable to scientific study or
have not been studied extensively.143 Sentencing factors might
include the defendant’s level of remorse, family support network,
level of education, and so forth.144 The question of the defendant’s
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
See id. at 571-72.
See id.; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
See generally Grisso & Kavanaugh, supra note 132.
See id.
See generally id.
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amenability for rehabilitation will inevitably be part of this
narrative.145
Our proposal to use burdens of proof, therefore, is intended to set
the floor on which the ultimate sentencing decision will be made. It
involves the pivotal and principal issue of the constitutional justification for punishing the youthful offender. This is an essential
first consideration for sentencers and it should be guided, to the
extent possible, by the scientific literature. Inevitably, sentencers
must make an individual decision about the defendant and this will
involve not only considerations of maturity but also sundry other
aggravating and mitigating considerations. Ultimately, the sentencing decision will be a product of competing narratives offered by
the defense and the prosecution, in a way symbolized conventionally
by the scales of justice. The burden of proof simply puts a thumb on
the scales, depending on the age cohort to which the defendant
belongs.
CONCLUSION
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has limited the ability
of courts to impose extreme sentences on juvenile offenders based
on a substantial research literature demonstrating that juveniles
are less culpable than adults due to their lack of maturity, susceptibility to outside influences, and their under-formed characters. The
Court, however, has maintained that a youthful offender is still
capable of committing offenses deserving of punishments such as
LWOP.146 Such an assessment as to whether one is “developmentally mature enough” to be sentenced to LWOP or other extreme
sentences requires a bright-line determination that is fundamentally at odds with an established body of research that juvenile and
young-adult development occurs gradually through approximately
age twenty-six. As it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine an individual’s level of maturity, let alone to predict their
capability for rehabilitation decades in the future, the risk of error
145. See id.
146. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 96 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Some crimes are so heinous,
and some juvenile offenders so highly culpable, that a sentence of life without parole may be
entirely justified under the Constitution.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
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is extremely high and the associated cost considerable. In this
Article, we outline a framework of shifting burdens of proof grounded in the scientific literature that can be employed to allocate this
risk of error. This approach would better reflect the well-established
science on the trajectory of developmental maturity from childhood
through young adulthood while still appreciating that courts require
a semblance of a bright-line rule to maintain consistency and predictability.

